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I. ECONOMICS AND CULTURE IN RIGHT-WING POLITICS 
On the surface, the term “culture wars” appears to capture 
controversies over the “social” or “moral” order, not the economic 
order.  But “free-market” economic ideology is a key hidden player 
on the right-wing team in the “culture wars.”  In turn, the “culture 
wars” debate serves that free-market fundamentalism by deploying 
“morality” both to mask and to legitimate rising economic inequality 
and the upward redistribution of resources.  By turning class into 
culture, and culture into class, as journalist Thomas Frank argues, 
Republicans made economic victimization a conservative cause in the 
2004 presidential campaign.1 
In the late-twentieth-century United States, the “culture wars” 
intensified along with the right’s power over government, media, 
culture, and academics.  This rightward political movement advanced 
through two prongs, neoconservativism and neoliberalism, both of 
which have aimed to undo policies particularly associated with 1960s 
egalitarian and democratic reform movements.  Neoconservativism 
focuses on culture—restoring traditional ideas of “morality,” 
“responsibility,” and “community.”2  Neoliberalism focuses on 
economics—restoring traditional laissez-faire policies of “market 
efficiency” and “competitiveness.”3 
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 1 Thomas Frank, Why They Won, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2004, at 31.
  
2 PETER STEINFELS, THE NEOCONSERVATIVES:  THE MEN WHO ARE CHANGING 
AMERICA’S POLITICS 53–63 (1979) (listing and explaining the key beliefs of 
neoconservativism). 
 3 See LISA DUGGAN, THE TWILIGHT OF EQUALITY?  NEOLIBERALISM, CULTURAL 
POLITICS, AND THE ATTACK ON DEMOCRACY 10 (2003) (“Neoliberalism, a political label 
retrospectively applied to the ‘conservative’ politics of the Reagan and Thatcher 
regimes in the U.S. and Great Britain, rocketed to prominence as the brand name 
for the form of pro-corporate, ‘free market,’ anti-‘big government’ rhetoric shaping 
Western national policy and dominating international financial institutions since the 
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In the conventional view, neoconservatives are the primary 
opponents of the progressive side of the culture wars, with neoliberals 
as neutral—or even allies—on “social” questions.  Although the 
divide between economics and culture sometimes splinters the right, 
this divide also creates two prongs that can work to strengthen the 
right’s grip on politics.  By fueling the “culture wars,” the right helps 
deflect the problem of “class warfare” away from right-wing economic 
policies and onto egalitarian social policies. 
From the Supreme Court to the mass media, the idea of the 
“culture wars” helps shift blame for elitism onto liberal attempts to 
disrupt traditional social hierarchies, shifting that blame away from 
conservative policies that widen both economic class divisions and 
“social” divisions based on race, gender, sexuality, disability, and 
religion.  For example, Justice Scalia characterized the Court’s equal 
protection ruling in Romer v. Evans4 as a decision to take the elite side 
in the “culture wars,” describing it as part of a pattern where the 
“lawyer class” protects its right to hand out jobs on the basis of 
country club membership but refuses to allow the non-elite majority 
to protect their “traditional sexual mores” against homosexuality.5  
Thomas Frank describes this construction of a cultural elite as a right-
wing strategy for seducing “Middle America” into sacrificing its 
economic interests for illusory “cultural” power: 
Vote to stop abortion; receive a rollback in capital gains taxes.  Vote 
to make our country strong again; receive deindustrialization.  Vote 
to screw those politically correct college professors; receive 
electricity deregulation. . . .  Vote to strike a blow against elitism; 
receive a social order in which wealth is more concentrated than 
ever before in our lifetimes, in which workers have been stripped 
of power and CEOs are rewarded in a manner beyond imagining.6 
In response to the often regressive impact of the “culture wars,” 
some opponents of right-wing politics advocate turning from culture 
to economics as the key to reviving progressive law and politics.  
Progressive legal scholarship in the United States has echoed left-
wing activists’ history of frequently dividing over the relative 
importance of class politics versus “identity politics.” 
 
early 1980s.”); Enrique R. Carrasco & M. Ayhan Kose, Income Distribution and the 
Bretton Woods Institutions:  Promoting an Enabling Environment for Social Development, 6 
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 5 n.15 (1996) (explaining that neoliberal 
policies are based on an idea of growth led by the private sector, a political focus on 
trade liberalization, and minimal state intervention in the market). 
 4 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 5 Id. at 652–53 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 6 THOMAS FRANK, WHAT’S THE MATTER WITH KANSAS:  HOW CONSERVATIVES WON 
THE HEART OF AMERICA 7 (2004). 
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Recently, for example, some have suggested that progressive law 
reform efforts should turn their focus from “culture” to “economics”: 
promoting, for instance, universal health insurance instead of gay 
marriage;7 class-based rather than race-based affirmative action in 
higher education;8 or funding for public education rather than rights 
for students with learning disabilities.9 
But others have responded to the right wing’s success in 
mobilizing cultural politics on behalf of elitist economic policies by 
resisting, rather than reinforcing, the class versus culture divide.  
Challenging liberal and leftist critics of “identity politics,” Lisa 
Duggan argues: 
Neoliberalism was constructed in and through cultural and 
identity politics and cannot be undone by a movement without 
constituencies and analyses that respond directly to that fact.  Nor 
will it be possible to build a new social movement that might be 
strong, creative, and diverse enough to engage the work of 
reinventing global politics for the new millennium as long as 
cultural and identity issues are separated, analytically and 
organizationally, from the political economy in which they are 
embedded.10 
For years, activists and scholars focusing on the Global South 
have astutely and actively resisted right-wing social and economic 
policies by treating them as interdependent.  For feminists focusing 
beyond North America and Europe, international finance, trade, and 
economic development policy have long been high on the agenda, so 
that questions of gender, sex, and family are questions of global 
economics as well as of culture and identity.11  Gayatri Spivak, for 
example, critiques the erasure of economics from cultural politics 
and cultural studies, but also warns against the old economic 
determinism that ignores the cultural politics of economics—such as 
the fact that women form much of the international surplus army of 
labor in the contemporary global economy.12  LatCrit scholarship has 
 
 7 See, e.g., Judith Butler, Can Marriage Be Saved:  A Forum, THE NATION, July 5, 
2004. 
 8 See, e.g., RICHARD KAHLENBERG, THE REMEDY:  CLASS, RACE AND AFFIRMATIVE 
ACTION 147–52 (1996). 
 9 See Mark Kelman & Gillian Lester, Ideology and Entitlement, in LEFT 
LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE 134 (Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002). 
 10 DUGGAN, supra note 3, at 3 (emphasis omitted). 
 11 See, e.g., PAYING THE PRICE:  WOMEN AND THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC STRATEGY (Mariarosa Dall Costa & Giovanna F. Dalla Costa eds., 1993). 
 12 See Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, IN OTHER WORLDS:  ESSAYS IN CULTURAL 
POLITICS 166–68 (1988); see also Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, A CRITIQUE OF 
POSTCOLONIAL REASON:  TOWARD A HISTORY OF THE VANISHING PRESENT 397–99 (1999) 
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been a particularly rich source of discussions of the connections 
between free-market economic policies and ideologies of race, 
gender, and nationality.13  Elizabeth Iglesias, for example, views 
neoliberal policies as reinforcing the anti-democratic hierarchies of 
colonial and neocolonial market structures.14 
II. ECONOMICS AND CULTURE IN LAW 
Nonetheless, the connections between neoliberalism and 
neoconservativism often remain obscure, partly because the divide 
between economic politics and cultural (or identity) politics is deeply 
embedded in the broader ideology of classical liberalism that 
grounds mainstream United States jurisprudence and policy analysis 
(whether politically “liberal” or “conservative”).15  In this scheme, laws 
 
(discussing how multinational capitalism serves neocolonialism but also how liberal 
multiculturalism can reinforce a neocolonial and neoliberal world order that 
combines economic inequality with gender and racial inequality). 
 13 See, e.g., Fran Ansley, Borders, 78 DENV. U. L. REV. 965 (2001) (discussing 
ideology of Latina/o subordination in “free trade” policies between the United States 
and Mexico); Enrique R. Carrasco, Law, Hierarchy and Vulnerable Groups in Latin 
America:  Towards a Communal Model of Development in a Neoliberal World, 30 STAN. J. 
INT’L L. 221 (1994); Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Global Markets, Racial Spaces, and the Role of 
Critical Race Theory in the Struggle for Community Control of Investments:  An Institutional 
Class Analysis, 45 VILL. L. REV. 1037 (2000) (exploring the relationships between 
economic ideology and policy and racial subordination in examples involving the 
United States, Peru, and the World Bank); Tayyab Mahmud, Postcolonial Imaginaries:  
Alternative Development or Alternatives to Development, 9 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 25 (1999) (showing that ideas about economic development inevitably 
implicate racial ideology); Chantal Thomas, Causes of Inequality in the International 
Economic Order:  Critical Race Theory and Postcolonial Development, 9 TRANSNAT’L L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (1999) (discussing how critical race theory’s critique of liberal 
legalism applies to the context of economic liberalism); Chantal Thomas, 
Globalization and the Reproduction of Hierarchy, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1351 (2000) 
(discussing examples of how “free market” policies involve government shaping of 
markets in ways that create or perpetuate racial hierarchies); Donna E. Young, 
Working Across Borders:  Global Restructuring and Women’s Work, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 1 
(discussing how ideas about race and gender shape the global market in women’s 
domestic labor). 
 14 See Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Human Rights in International Economic Law:  Locating 
Latinas/os in the Linkage Debates, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 361, 384 (1997); see 
also Elizabeth M. Iglesias & Francisco Valdes, LatCrit at Five:  Institutionalizing a 
Postsubordination Future, 78 DENV. U. L. REV. 1249, 1312 n.168 (2001) (discussing 
“postcolonial neoliberalism” as “the inter/national [sic] economic policies and 
global political economy that impose ‘free’ markets on diverse societies for the 
benefit of corporate profits, oftentimes subjugating humans to exploitation and 
poverty, based on colonial and neocolonial histories and legacies”). 
 15 DUGGAN, supra note 3, at 4–11.  Not to be confused with “liberal” as opposed to 
“conservative” policies, the general political philosophy of classical liberalism 
imagines a public sphere separate from the market and family, with government’s 
authority derived from autonomous public citizens.  “Liberal” and “conservative” 
policies represent positions along a continuum within this ideology; these positions 
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regulating race, gender, religion, family form or sexual orientation 
are primarily about the social or moral order.  In contrast, laws 
regulating business, jobs and international finance are about the 
economic order. 
In the mainstream view, questions of law and economics require 
understanding market forces that are at least partly separable from 
culture and ideology.  The well-funded law and economics school of 
thought purports to emphasize free contract, distinct from ascribed 
status, and to evaluate policies through mathematical calculations of 
costs and benefits, distinct from religious or moral judgments.16  The 
conventional wisdom assumes that questions of “economic efficiency” 
(at least in theory) involve objective, scientific, universal principles 
conducive to national and international harmonization in the 
interest of all.17  In contrast, the conventional wisdom assumes 
“cultural” issues in law generally involve subjective, inevitably 
contested moral questions that cannot be resolved without privileging 
the beliefs of some people over those of others. 
This mainstream view not only divides economics from cultural 
politics, but often helps present this divide as a hierarchy that 
privileges the role of law in promoting “markets” and marginalizes 
the role of law in producing and remedying race, gender, sexual, 
religious, or disability subordination.  This scheme reflects and 
reinforces a political climate where policies promoting social equality 
get ridiculed as “political correctness,” but policies promoting 
economic inequality get taken seriously as “economic correctness” (in 
the pseudo-scientific guise of “efficiency”).18 
 
differ over how to apply classical liberalism—where to draw the lines separating state 
from family, for example.  See id. at 6–7. 
 16 See, e.g., ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 3–23 (2d ed. 
1997) (portraying economic analysis of law as a scientific and mathematical approach 
to evaluating policies). 
 17 The idea of objective “efficiency” separate from subjective “equity” was a 
product of the political and historical effort to legitimate neoclassical economics as a 
science, but in practice the distinction between efficiency and equity can only be 
made based on faith or politics, not science.  See Martha McCluskey, Efficiency and 
Social Citizenship:  Challenging the Neoliberal Attack on the Welfare State, 78 IND. L.J. 783, 
788–89 & nn.16–21 (2003) [hereinafter McCluskey, Efficiency and Social Citizenship]. 
 18 For a detailed analysis of how “efficiency” is a political strategy rather than a 
scientific concept, and that it is impossible to objectively distinguish it from its 
supposed opposite, “equity,” see Martha T. McCluskey, The Illusion of Efficiency in 
Workers’ Compensation “Reform”, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 657, 716–50 (1998); see also Martha 
T. McCluskey, The Politics of Economics in Welfare Reform, in FEMINISM CONFRONTS HOMO 
ECONOMICUS (Martha A. Fineman & Terence Dougherty eds., forthcoming 2005) 
(analyzing how the idea of “economic correctness” shaped the welfare reform 
debate). 
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 Recall Plessy v. Ferguson,19 the infamous 1896 opinion that 
authorized more than a half-century of American apartheid by 
upholding a state law requiring railroad cars to be divided into 
“white” and “colored” sections.20  By concluding that this racial 
segregation was a “social” matter,21 outside of the state or market, the 
Supreme Court was able to dismiss the resulting racial inequality as 
too contingent and personal to be a serious constitutional problem.  
In the Court’s view, racial segregation is only a badge of inferiority if 
“the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it.”22  At the 
same time, by describing the racial inequality as “social,” the Court 
was able to portray it as too essential and inevitable to be susceptible 
to legal intervention.  Plessy depicted the racial segregation in 
question as driven by natural physical differences, “racial instincts,” 
and “general sentiment”—forces that the law is “powerless to 
eradicate.”23  The Court assumed that “social” equality must await 
changes in “natural affinities” free from judicial intervention.24 
A century or so later, Justice Scalia makes similar moves when he 
divides culture from political and economic rights in Romer v. Evans25 
and Lawrence v. Texas.26  By describing those cases as battles in a 
“culture war,” Justice Scalia shifts the focus from government 
subordination to private preference and personal taste.  For example, 
in his Lawrence dissent, Justice Scalia describes the majority’s decision 
to strike down Texas’ sodomy law as a product of “law-profession 
culture,” which is driven by a “homosexual agenda,”27 and as a 
decision to “[take] sides in the culture war” beyond the Court’s 
proper role of making sure “that the democratic rules of engagement 
are observed.”28  Like the Court’s opinion in Plessy, Justice Scalia’s 
invocation of culture makes the inequality appear too contingent but 
at the same time too fixed and universal to be amenable to 
 
 19 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 20 Id. at 552. 
 21 Id. at 544, 551. 
 22 Id. at 551. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. 
 25 See 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (characterizing 
Colorado’s constitutional amendment banning antidiscrimination protection for gay 
men or lesbians as an issue of “Kulturkampf” not prejudice). 
 26 See 539 U.S. 558, 602 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (admonishing the Court for 
having departed from the role of “neutral observer” and for having “taken sides in 
the culture war” in its decision to strike down a Texas law criminalizing same-sex 
sodomy). 
 27 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 28 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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constitutional redress.  Justice Kennedy’s majority opinions in both 
Romer and Lawrence, in contrast, echo Justice Harlan’s dissent in Plessy 
by linking the state laws at issue to questions of broad and systemic 
political, legal, and market power.29  Likewise, concurring in Lawrence, 
Justice O’Connor notes the impact of the criminalization of same-sex 
sodomy on employment, housing, and family rights.30 
By turning caste into culture, the reasoning in the Plessy majority 
and in Justice Scalia’s dissents serves right-wing economic as well as 
cultural politics.  It is true that “free market” advocates’ anti-
government ideology may lead some to reject Justice Scalia’s (and 
Plessy’s) embrace of government-imposed “culture.”  But those 
libertarians concerned with minimizing government control of 
economic elites likely will find plenty to celebrate and support in 
Justice Scalia’s (if not Plessy’s) construction of a cultural realm that 
can take the blame for problematic political economies away from 
both government and market.  Both the “free market” and cultural 
branches of the right wing often work together to gain from (and 
finance) an overarching message that construes individual freedom 
primarily as government deference to a romanticized idea of 
nineteenth-century tradition in both “culture” and “market.”31 
In contrast, opponents of right-wing cultural politics tend to 
define individual freedom as the ability to express “cultural” 
preferences without restraint from external authority, whether 
majoritarian, paternal, natural, or supernatural.  But that view of 
cultural liberalism often appears to present a tough trade-off for 
progressives.  Social equality seems to require protecting individual 
freedom in cultural matters.  On the other hand, economic equality 
seems to require restricting individual freedom in market matters.32  As 
a result, progressives tend to support freedom from government 
 
 29 Indeed, Justice Kennedy opened his opinion in Romer by quoting Justice 
Harlan’s dissent in Plessy, saying that “the Constitution ‘neither knows nor tolerates 
classes among citizens.’”  Romer, 517 U.S. at 623 (quoting Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 
(Harlan, J., dissenting)). 
 30 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 582 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 31 See, e.g., JEAN STEFANCIC & RICHARD DELGADO, NO MERCY:  HOW CONSERVATIVE 
THINK TANKS AND FOUNDATIONS CHANGED AMERICA’S SOCIAL AGENDA 89–95 (1996) 
(describing how various conservative think tanks promoted welfare reform 
legislation); DANIEL YERGIN & JOSEPH STANISLAW, THE COMMANDING HEIGHTS:  THE 
BATTLE BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND THE MARKETPLACE THAT IS REMAKING THE MODERN 
WORLD 332 (1998) (quoting neoconservative Irving Kristol’s remark that “around 
1980, the free-market school of thought and the neoconservative school of thought 
fused”). 
 32 This conundrum is behind liberal jurisprudence’s obsession with reconciling 
the post-Lochner constitutional rejection of economic rights with the Warren Court’s 
constitutional embrace of other rights. 
  
1298 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW Vol. 35:1291 
regulation in the interest of individual choice on cultural or moral 
issues, but to oppose what might seem to be a comparable individual 
freedom of choice on economic issues. 
In short, that framework appears to give progressives a choice 
between, on the one hand, an old paternalistic order based on 
cultural status and coercion that includes economic protection, or, 
on the other hand, a new order based on contract and freedom in 
place of status that promotes individual economic risk and 
responsibility.  For example, in the political and legal debate over the 
sodomy law challenged in Lawrence, progressives joined forces in the 
cultural wars with right-wing economic libertarians (such as the Cato 
Institute) to advocate for individual freedom from government 
regulation.33  That coalition, however, risked lending strength to an 
ideology that makes eliminating the New Deal’s economic 
egalitarianism the leading means to achieving greater “social” 
equality free from status markers of race, gender, and sexuality.  The 
globalized free-market economy is another example of an apparent 
tough trade-off for progressives between cultural and economic 
equality.  In the conventional wisdom, neoliberal free-trade policies 
risk greater economic inequality, but supposedly bring openness in 
culture, which dislodges traditional social stratification and moral 
regulation.34  After the 2004 presidential election, some argued that 
Democrats can only advance progressive economic policies if they 
back off from supporting liberal moral policies (like gay 
marriage)35—recalling the earlier New Deal compromise that won 
economic security (for some) by acquiescing in the “social traditions” 
 
 33 See Brief of the Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (U.S. 2003) (No. 02-102) (arguing that Texas’ 
criminalization of same-sex sodomy violates constitutional privacy protections for 
consensual adult sexual activity), available at 2003 WL 152342. 
 34 See, e.g., THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE:  UNDERSTANDING 
GLOBALIZATION 207–09 (1999) (providing anecdotes of how global capitalism 
expanded opportunities for some Middle Eastern women to escape restrictive 
religious, gender, and family traditions). 
 35 See, e.g., Jonathan Freedland, Soul Searching on the Left . . . and a softening of the 
right?:  Democrats Can’t Win Until Their Politics Are Born Again, GUARDIAN (London), 
Nov. 6, 2004, at 24 (arguing that the Democrats will have to meet “red state” voters at 
least halfway on moral issues); Jesse Joynes, Letter to the Editor, Christian Values Don’t 
Fit with Democratic Party, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (FLA.), Nov. 6, 2004 (arguing, from his 
perspective as a low-income Christian “working man” who voted for Bush, that if the 
Democrats cannot adopt “Christian” values they should “abandon all social policy 
and go back to representing solely the economic interest of working people”), 
available at 
http://www.sptimes.com/2004/11/06/Opinion/Christian_values_don_.shtml (last 
modified Nov. 6, 2004). 
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of the old Southern Confederacy.36 
But while the left agonizes over trade-offs between class politics 
and cultural politics, and between government intervention and 
personal freedom, the right works to have it both ways.  The liberal 
idea of an inevitably tragic choice between individual freedom or 
government intervention is misleading, because it begs the questions 
of what government intervention (and on whose behalf) counts as 
individual freedom, and which individual rights are construed as 
government intervention—which in turn depend on the question of 
what counts as “public” and what counts as “private.”  Identity and 
status—ideas about race and gender in particular—have long shaped 
the answers to those questions. 
The right’s recent political successes have been facilitated by 
linking free-market ideology with neoconservative cultural ideas so 
that “individual freedom” gets associated with policies that promote 
both economic and social hierarchies in the popular imagination.  
The Olin Foundation, formed in 1977, has since “invested” $50 
million in law and economics scholarship as part of a broader 
“crusade” aimed at promoting “non-egalitarian” ideology, with the 
explicit purpose of creating cultural or moral, as well as economic 
change.37  The rhetoric of economic libertarianism is saturated with 
references to cultural politics.38  For instance, economic libertarians 
often use the phrase “the nanny state” to disparage “liberal” welfare 
and regulatory policies, thereby suggesting that freedom from 
government control is linked to the restoration of a “proper” 
hierarchy of gender, race, and class.39  Economic libertarians and 
 
 36 See ROBERT C. LIEBERMAN, SHIFTING THE COLOR LINE:  RACE AND THE AMERICAN 
WELFARE STATE (1998) (analyzing how New Deal social programs were structured to 
maintain white supremacy); Leon Wieseltier, The Elect, NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 22, 2004, 
at 12 (“If this were 1960, Karl Rove would have arranged referenda on segregation.”). 
 37 See WILLIAM E. SIMON, A TIME FOR REFLECTION 266–67, 272 (2004) (former 
longtime president of Olin Foundation describing its founding and its focus on law 
and economics as a vehicle for conservative change); WILLIAM E. SIMON, A TIME FOR 
ACTION 132 (1980) (explaining that economic issues are first and foremost moral–
political issues); WILLIAM E. SIMON, A TIME FOR TRUTH 231 (1978) (explaining 
author’s philanthropic strategy, implemented in the Olin Foundation, to redirect 
wealthy capital owners’ money from general support for academic institutions toward 
scholarship specifically legitimating anti-egalitarian policies). 
 38 See GEORGE LAKOFF, MORAL POLITICS:  WHAT CONSERVATIVES KNOW THAT 
LIBERALS DON’T (1996) (describing how economic conservativism relies on rhetoric 
of a “strict father,” as opposed to the liberal “nurturing parent”). 
 39 See, e.g., Myriam Marquez, Florida Democrats Stuck with Kerry, ORLANDO SENTINEL, 
Mar. 4, 2004, at A21 (criticizing presidential candidate John Kerry for advancing 
“nanny state” policies); Martha T. McCluskey, Subsidized Lives and the Ideology of 
Efficiency, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 115, 150 (2000) (citing and criticizing 
use of the “nanny state slur”); WILLIAM E. SIMON, A TIME FOR ACTION, supra note 37, at 
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social conservatives work together through lavishly funded think 
tanks and law firms to challenge the welfare and regulatory states as 
government “intervention” that detracts from both personal and 
political strength.40  For example, moral and economic arguments 
worked together to promote welfare reform as a problem of a “cycle 
of dependency” needing the solution of more “personal 
responsibility.”41 
But when neoconservative cultural arguments threaten 
progressive economic policies, advocates of progressive policies do 
not need to make a tough trade-off between culture and class.  
Progressives can do more to reframe the debate about the “culture 
wars,” so that “social” inequality and “moral” questions no longer 
appear separate from the political economy, and so that economic 
equality no longer appears antithetical to cultural freedom. 
III. ECONOMICS AND CULTURE IN POPULAR CULTURE 
Within a dominant ideological framework that divides the 
“social” and “political” from the “economic,” increased media 
attention to America’s economic inequality may nonetheless work to 
reinforce both neoconservative and neoliberal ideas and policies.  As 
one example that might serve as a cautionary tale about the problems 
with this new focus on class conflict over cultural conflict, consider 
the cover story of the Atlantic Monthly’s March 2004 issue, How Serfdom 
Saved the Women’s Movement:  Dispatches from the Nanny Wars.42 
Author Caitlin Flanagan, who opens the essay with her own 
experience as a new mother balancing a baby and a writing career, 
discusses the limits of feminist efforts to reform the gendered 
structure of work and family.  She summarizes writer Naomi Wolf’s 
approach to feminist motherhood:  “She had wanted a revolution; 
what she got was a Venezuelan.”43  Empathizing with Wolf, the author 
dismisses feminist debates about the gender politics of housework as 
 
22 (Olin Foundation leader outlining his political and philanthropic project of 
challenging “‘big mother’ down in Washington” who treats Americans like “self-
indulgent infants who need a federal nanny to look after us at every waking 
moment”). 
 40 STEFANCIC & DELGADO, supra note 31, at 83–95 (discussing how conservative 
support for restrictive welfare reform drew on both economic libertarian and 
corporate interests, as well as on cultural and religious conservatives, to demonize 
welfare and welfare recipients). 
 41 See McCluskey, Efficiency and Social Citizenship, supra note 17, at 807–32. 
 42 Caitlin Flanagan, How Serfdom Saved the Women’s Movement:  Dispatches from the 
Nanny Wars, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 2004, at 109. 
 43 Id. at 126 (discussing NAOMI WOLF, MISCONCEPTIONS:  TRUTH, LIES, AND THE 
UNEXPECTED ON THE JOURNEY TO MOTHERHOOD (2003)). 
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outdated and silly.44  After all, Flanagan explains, neither she nor her 
husband have ever changed their own bedsheets.45  In the author’s 
view, ivory-tower feminist theory urges privileged young women to 
challenge the prevailing gender order,46 but feminists in the real 
world instead ease the burdens of women’s inequality by accepting 
and exacerbating class and race inequality.47  The essay describes this 
development in feminism as a divine economic intervention.  Like 
“magic” from a “fairy godmother,” the “forces of global capitalism” 
delivered to the doors of affluent white American families an 
abundant supply of immigrant women of color eager to change 
diapers and clean toilets for low wages.48 
The lesson of this Atlantic Monthly story is that feminists should 
give up their “fixation” with “ending the mommy wars” and 
promoting “work-life balance” in favor of attention to what the 
author suggests is the more “real and heart-rending struggle of poor 
women and children.”49  As the author explains it, professional-class 
mothers have no serious material complaints about gender 
oppression—since “we” can turn to the plentiful supply of immigrant 
Latina nannies and maids to do what she calls the “shit work” at “our” 
convenience and under “our” control.50  Instead, the problems of 
“feminist working mothers” are simply a matter of inevitable tragic 
trade-offs between different choices for personal fulfillment: kids or 
career; and the moral angst of using race and class privilege to make 
that choice a bit less vexing.51 
 
 44 See id. at 113 (“[B]ecause of these petty, almost laughably low concerns—the 
unmade beds, the children with their endless questions, the crumbs and jelly on the 
counter, the tendency of a good fight over housework to stop the talking and the 
kissing and the, well, you know—one of the most profound cultural revolutions in 
American history came perilously close to running aground.”). 
 45 Id. at 111 (dismissing Alix Kates Shulman’s 1970 essay on the marital division 
of household labor and adding that she and her husband also delegate to a nanny 
chores like scrubbing the bathtubs, dusting the bookcase, mopping the floors, and 
washing her sons’ laundry). 
 46 See id. at 126 (describing Naomi Wolf’s questioning of “a foreordained 
hierarchy of class and gender” and her ideal of egalitarian parenthood as unrealistic 
dreams “formed while tripping across green New Haven quadrangles on her way to 
feminist-theory classes”). 
 47 See id. at 114 (describing the politics of racial and economic justice as personal 
moral “equivocations” that “simply evaporated”). 
 48 Id. at 113. 
 49 Id. at 128. 
 50 See id. at 126–27 (describing the author’s own disillusionment at finding out 
motherhood and homemaking involved more than “lying on the couch reading and 
drinking coffee and talking on the telephone” before she found a nanny to restore 
her leisure). 
 51 See id. at 128 (insisting that “an upper-middle-class woman” must suffer “agony” 
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However, this argument for turning moral or political concern 
from gender to class does not aim to get Naomi Wolf and similarly 
affluent white American women to follow or support their Latina 
sisters in revolution, or even in Venezuelan-style economic reforms.52  
To the contrary, the author criticizes feminist efforts to unite women 
across class lines as elitist fantasies:  American mothers, she claims, 
want personal domestic servants, not universal public day care.53  The 
author concludes that feminists should simply focus on getting 
affluent women to make the current status hierarchy work better by 
complying with the minimal legal rules for household help.  Her 
solution?  Pay those Social Security taxes, ladies!54 
In contrast to Mary Romero’s careful analysis of the complex 
interdependence of race, class, and gender oppression in the nanny 
trade,55 Flanagan’s essay frames the problem as liberalism’s traditional 
trade-off between cultural politics and class politics.  It presents 
gender equality as the reason for nannies’ economic oppression (and 
mostly drops race out of the picture).  In Flanagan’s view, the 
movement of privileged women into the professional workplace, 
made possible by feminism, created the demand for low-wage 
domestic servants.  With women’s freedom to work outside the home 
 
and “anguish” if she is separated from her child and denied the chance to go to 
“‘Mommy and Me’ classes,” due to that mother’s selfish and spoiled inability to 
accept that she cannot have it all). 
 52 Venezuela, in particular, is currently an important site of political struggle 
between the free-market (neoliberal) economic approach promoted by the United 
States and a more progressive approach favoring increased funding for education, 
health, public utilities, housing, and agricultural development.  See Silene Ramirez, 
Venezuela Spurns IMF, Says Its Recipes Not Needed, REUTERS, Apr. 25, 2004, available at 
www.arena.org.nz/venimf.htm; Brian Ellsworth, The Oil Company as Social Worker, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 11, 2004, at W1 (describing how the Venezuelan government is using oil 
profits to fund programs benefiting the nation’s impoverished majority contrary to 
the advice of the private multinational oil industry); see also Duncan Campbell, 
Famous Names Speak Up for Chavez in Venezuela Poll, GUARDIAN (London), Aug. 5, 2004, 
at 17 (reporting on statement of support from writers, academics, politicians, and 
artists around the world on behalf of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez and his 
policies). 
 53 See Flanagan, supra note 42, at 124–25 (asserting, “get a bunch of professional-
class mothers together, and they will freely admit that day care sucks; get a nanny,” 
and citing an advice book focusing on elite business school graduates). 
 54 See id. at 128 (giving author’s solution to “upper-middle-class working 
mothers[’]” guilt); id. at 122–23 (criticizing arguments that Zoe Baird’s failure to pay 
her nanny’s Social Security taxes should not have been a barrier to Baird’s 
appointment as Attorney General). 
 55 See generally MARY ROMERO, MAID IN THE USA (2002); Mary Romero, Nanny 
Diaries and Other Stories:  Imagining Immigrant Women’s Labor in the Social Reproduction of 
American Families, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 809 (2003); Mary Romero, Unraveling Privilege:  
Workers’ Children and the Hidden Costs of Paid Childcare, 76 CHI.- KENT L. REV. 1651 
(2001). 
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comes women’s freedom to exploit workers and to be exploited as 
workers.  The answer to this tough trade-off, the essay concludes, is to 
adjust the trade-off slightly: affluent working mothers should stop 
demanding even more independence and freedom from the costs of 
kids and family, and should instead support an expanded vision of 
domestic paternalism that includes better treatment of dependent 
servants. 
But a closer reading of the story shows that the economic 
inequality it confronts is linked to continued political pressure for 
gender inequality, not only to demands for gender equality.  It is not 
just feminist pressure for women to be equal economic actors in the 
workplace that fuels affluent women’s demand for nannies, but also 
traditional gender, race, sex, and class-based ideas about domesticity 
and motherhood.  The essay mentions two primary reasons affluent 
women reject professional day-care centers in favor of in-home 
nannies.  First, nannies enhance affluent women’s domestic authority 
in a way that maintains gendered separate spheres—the child is in 
the home, and the hired caregiver is like family.56  Second, affluent 
women need nannies because their 24/7 professional jobs require 
that they hire caregivers who are also available to work long, 
unpredictable hours.57 
Although the story claims that “serfdom saved the women’s 
movement,”58 it could also be read to support the conclusion that this 
domestic “serfdom” saved the patriarchy.  Flanagan’s story carefully 
excludes husbands and fathers from the picture she paints of child 
care and housework in the homes of the affluent, married, white 
women with whom she identifies, and she embraces without 
discussion the assumption that domesticity and parenthood are 
distinctly female responsibilities, passions, and agonies.  Moreover, 
she identifies the feminist movement with white, professional, 
American women, erasing from view any consideration of, for 
example, feminist organizing by Latin American women who seek 
alternatives to migrant domestic labor. 
Finally, Flanagan readily buries the evidence of racial hierarchy 
in the nanny trade under the rubric of economic class, which she in 
turn distances from more recent political struggles by using the 
perhaps quaint-sounding term of “serfdom.”  If she had more boldly 
 
 56 See Flanagan, supra note 42, at 109. 
 57 Id. at 124 (citing advice book for professional women noting that the need to 
spend time transporting a child to and from day care could be obviated by having an 
in-home nanny). 
 58 Id. at 109. 
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concluded that not “serfdom” but “racism” or “white supremacy” 
saved the women’s movement, perhaps the essay would appear less 
cute and comfortable in its acquiescence in a hierarchical status quo.  
Although she notes that the nanny trade consists largely of white-
skinned women hiring dark-skinned women, Flanagan fails to discuss 
whether affluent white Americans choose immigrant nannies over 
day care not just to conserve time, money, and sentimental 
attachment to at-home motherhood, but also to maintain and 
enhance a racialized division of domesticity, work, and power.  As the 
ideology of affluent American womanhood changed to center on 
mother–child bonding in the late twentieth century,59 and as 
domestic civil rights laws increased the economic power of some 
black American workers, American families largely replaced African 
American domestic servants with Latina women.60  Studies of the 
nanny trade report a recent tendency among white affluent 
Americans to romanticize the maternal qualities of Latina immigrant 
women and to identify them with a simple, loving, and docile peasant 
culture.61 
When Flanagan reports that “you can take your pick” of nannies 
available to immediately start caring for your child, she notes that the 
current casualness with which nannies are traded among affluent 
families reflects “slaveholding traditions.”62  She discusses this 
commodification as a gender problem devoid of racial ideology.  She 
worries that the nanny trade threatens the affluent woman’s identity 
as a mother (even as it reinforces it) because the mother risks selling 
part of her baby’s love when she buys a nanny’s care.63  Dorothy 
Roberts, however, explains that the ideology of American 
 
 59 See JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER:  WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND 
WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 36 (2000) (noting how both unpaid mothers and paid 
domestic servants in the 1930s and 1940s focused their work on maintaining the 
home rather than on entertaining or educating children). 
 60 See Barbara Ehrenreich & Arlie Russel Hochschild, Introduction to GLOBAL 
WOMAN:  NANNIES, MAIDS AND SEX WORKERS IN THE NEW ECONOMY 1, 6 (Barbara 
Ehrenreich & Arlie Russel Hochschild eds., 2002) (reporting that sixty percent of 
domestics were African Americans in the 1940s but that a majority now are Latina 
and many are foreign-born). 
 61 See Arlie Russell Hochschild, Love and Gold, in GLOBAL WOMEN, supra note 60, 
at 15, 23–25 (showing that this maternalism is not a natural cultural trait of certain 
immigrant groups, but is constructed in response to the demands of affluent 
American families); see also RHACEL SALAZAR PARRENAS, SERVANTS OF GLOBALIZATION:  
WOMEN, MIGRATION AND DOMESTIC WORK 177–79 (2001) (discussing the intersection 
of race and class differences in the demand for black, Filipina, and Latina domestic 
labor). 
 62 Flanagan, supra note 42, at 127. 
 63 Id. at 127–28. 
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motherhood has long relied on and reproduced a racial division of 
labor in which “menial” mothering work is identified with dark-
skinned women and “spiritual” mothering with white women.64  
Flanagan describes her own decision to enlist a nanny to fulfill her 
dreamy ideal of at-home mothering as a crisis of her own sense of 
entitlement to be free from what she considers menial work.65  
“Wasn’t I designed for more important things than putting away Lego 
blocks and loading the dishwasher?  I was.  It was time.  Cherchez la 
femme.”66  The story is softened with self-deprecating irony that makes 
it easier for Flanagan to trivialize the question of whether the sense of 
privilege that incited her nanny search was simply a “feminist-type, 
really cheesed-off kind of funk” or also a feeling of white racial 
entitlement.67 
The essay’s misleading focus on gender equality as the central 
cause of nannies’ economic inequality ironically undermines its call for 
more attention to class oppression.  This “nanny wars” essay turns 
economic equality from a public policy issue into a personal moral 
problem.  The author presents affluent women’s demand for more 
child-care support from employers or the government as selfish 
whining or foolish idealism driven by elite academic culture or 
individual character, divorced from politics or economics.  Following 
this premise, the author concludes that the solution to the child care 
problem is not subsidized day care but a little more self-sacrifice, 
empathy, and charity from affluent women toward the less privileged 
“others” whose domestic services they employ.  That answer, however, 
reinforces the economic and racial inequality it claims to redress by 
affirming affluent white women’s entitlement to exercise their 
benevolent authority as the best way to ease the inevitable burdens on 
struggling subordinate “others.”  The essay ignores the question of 
whether the specific small step it proposes—increased compliance 
with Social Security tax laws—requires going beyond the moral 
sentiments of privileged women to include structural or public 
measures such as stronger government enforcement of tax and labor 
regulations or reforms in immigration laws that would give migrating 
workers more bargaining power over job benefits. 
By criticizing the “nanny wars” as a cultural battle apart from 
economic and political conflicts, the essay takes the heat off class 
 
 64 See generally Dorothy E. Roberts, Spiritual and Menial Housework, 9 YALE J.L. & 
FEMINISM 51 (1997). 
 65 Flanagan, supra note 42, at 126. 
 66 Id. at 127. 
 67 Id. 
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politics.  Its discussion of class obscures from view the self-interested 
actions of fathers, wealthy capital owners, shareholders and directors 
of global corporations, or politicians who shape international 
financial institutions, putting off the table any possibility of their 
moral obligations and responsibility to sacrifice some gains for the 
well-being of others.  Affluent mothers—along with the feminist 
academics or writers who try to influence them—are the only moral 
agents in the story.  Employers’ demands for more profit or for 
workers available eighty hours a week, for instance, are taken for 
granted as natural forces, not selfish interests. 
The Atlantic Monthly essay depicts the nanny’s economic 
disadvantages as natural, inherent in her status as a racialized other 
who appears to have no right or power to make her own demands for 
better choices about balancing work and family.  Instead, the nanny 
seems to be a commodity passively imported by the international 
economy to save the affluent American family.  And conversely, the 
author’s fairy godmother explanation of how affluent white, 
heterosexual, American families got “their” nannies seems to ground 
those families’ race and class privileges in divine right.  By depicting 
this economic inequality as a force beyond the reach of human 
politics, this narrative makes affluent Americans’ moral obligations 
seem limited to personal decisions to obey the tax laws, rather than 
public actions to oppose the neoliberal policies of structural 
adjustment and privatization that impoverish so many Latin 
American women.68  And by suggesting that economic disadvantage is 
a mysterious attribute of racialized others, rather than a government 
strategy that enriches wealthy capital owners at the expense of most 
workers, this narrative helps prevent affluent American women from 
considering how neoliberal policies can also put them at risk.  After 
all, some of their nannies were also formerly middle-class mothers 
and wives with professional careers.69 
Flanagan’s essay fills an important gap in mainstream media 
discussions of feminism by highlighting the class and race bias of 
many well-publicized commentators on motherhood.  But by 
 
 68 On neoliberal structural adjustment policies as a source of international 
poverty, see MICHEL CHOSSUDOVSKY, THE GLOBALISATION OF POVERTY:  IMPACTS OF IMF 
AND WORLD BANK REFORMS (1997).  On the impact of neoliberal economic policies 
on women, see THE STRATEGIC SILENCE:  GENDER AND ECONOMIC POLICY (Isabella 
Bakker ed., 1994); CHRISTA WICHTERICH, THE GLOBALIZED WOMAN:  REPORTS FROM A 
FUTURE OF INEQUALITY 97–128 (2000). 
 69 See Hochschild, supra note 61, at 16–18 (noting that Filipina women working as 
nannies in the United States tend to have professional training and job experience in 
fields such as nursing, teaching, and administration). 
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opposing class oppression to gender politics, the essay joins these 
writers in taking broader questions of political economy out of 
gender politics.  Flanagan reinforces neoliberal economic ideology by 
making class inequality appear to be primarily a matter of culture, 
rather than of law and policy.  Why is it that mainstream American 
popular media represents feminists as affluent white professionals 
who talk about the joys (or angst) of motherhood, instead of the evils 
of the International Monetary Fund (IMF); and that the prevailing 
images of Latinas portray them as domestic servants who don’t talk 
much about either gender equity or the IMF?70  Neoliberal policies 
promoting increasingly concentrated corporate control of the media 
are part of the explanation.71 
IV. INTEGRATING ECONOMICS, POLITICS, AND CULTURE 
The Atlantic Monthly essay, like much legal scholarship, treats the 
problem of economic inequality as a problem separate from the 
central mission of state and market.  Ironically, the failure to 
challenge the liberal tradition dividing economics from culture and 
from the state helps to make class differences appear to be a problem 
of “culture.”  The market’s presumed freedom from traditional status 
hierarchy or state-enforced moral prescriptions helps make economic 
inequality appear to be a problem of private preferences or personal 
character—and therefore relegated to “culture.”  Mainstream law and 
policy analysis wrongly treats economic inequality as a question of 
“redistribution,” a moral question distinct from questions of 
economic efficiency or basic political rights.72  The “Nanny Wars” 
essay reflects this framework by addressing economic class as a 
problem of personal charity or morality by the affluent toward those 
on the losing end of the global market’s “magic.” 
To transform the class politics of the nanny wars in particular, or 
the cultural wars more generally, advocates of progressive economic 
policy will need to go further to challenge the economic and cultural 
ideologies that work in concert to present the privileges of current 
market winners as generally the result of neutral public policy, 
 
 70 See Melissa Block & Joel Rose, New Report Says Characters on Prime Time Television 
Shows Remain Markedly Less Diverse Than the Nation as a Whole (NPR radio broadcast, 
Apr. 21, 2004) (reporting on study by advocacy group, Children Now, finding that 
Latino and Latina characters on television are four times more likely than characters 
of other races to be portrayed as domestic workers). 
 71 See C. EDWIN BAKER, MEDIA, MARKETS AND DEMOCRACY (2002) (analyzing impact 
of media deregulation and free trade on democracy and diversity). 
 72 See McCluskey, Efficiency and Social Citizenship, supra note 17, at 787–88 
(criticizing the distinction between efficiency and redistribution). 
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virtuous morality, and divine justice.  Perhaps a progressive politics 
that integrates class and culture could strive to turn around the 
“nanny state” epithet, making the idea of “nannies” gaining real 
power in state, market, and family not ridiculous or dangerous but 
essential to democracy, freedom, and justice. 
